Theological thinking and the reading of Scripture : an Auseinandersetzung with Susannah Ticciati. by Moberly,  R.W.L.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 May 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Moberly, R.W.L. (2016) 'Theological thinking and the reading of Scripture : an Auseinandersetzung with
Susannah Ticciati.', Journal of theological interpretation., 10 (1). pp. 103-116.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.eisenbrauns.com/ECOM/4N10G5YM3.HTM
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk



Journal of Theological Interpretation 10.1 (2016) 103–116
Theological Thinking and the Reading of 
Scripture: An Auseinandersetzung  
with Susannah Ticciati
R. W. L. Moberly
Durham University
Abstract — This article considers the relationship between the Bible and 
theology via the work of Susannah Ticciati, who works with the Bible 
from the perspective of theology. An exposition of Ticciati’s account of 
election and divine jealousy in Rom 9–11 and Deut 32 highlights the role 
that a postbiblical understanding of creation ex nihilo plays in Ticciati’s 
readings of Scripture. Questions are raised about criteria whereby this 
sort of theological perspective can be recognized to illuminate, or to skew, 
a reading of the biblical text. The understanding of clean and unclean in 
relation to Israel’s election in Lev 20 and Acts 10 is proposed as an issue 
that may pose difficulties for Ticciati’s reading of election. Ticciati’s work 
is seen to pose issues of theological hermeneutics in an unusually clear 
and interesting form.
Key Words — Susannah Ticciati, election, creation ex nihilo, clean and unclean, 
Romans 9–11, Deuteronomy 32, Acts 10
The Bible is fundamental to Christian theology. So far, so uncontro-
versial. But as soon as one tries to be more specific about the relationship 
between Bible and theology, consensus disappears.
One of the most famous statements of what has become a character-
istic core understanding in modern biblical scholarship is Johann Gabler’s 
1787 inaugural lecture, De justo discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae 
regundisque recte utriusque finibus (“An Oration on the Proper Distinction 
between Biblical and Dogmatic Theology and the Specific Objectives of 
Each”). 1 To be sure, it was not that one could not in principle do both 
biblical and dogmatic theology, and Gabler certainly saw the former as a 
preliminary to the latter. However, the tasks were in principle distinct and 
1. See John Sandys-Wunsch and Laurence Eldredge, “J. P. Gabler and the Distinction 
between Biblical and Dogmatic Theology: Translation, Commentary, and Discussion of His 
Originality,” SJT 33 (1980): 133–58; also, with further bibliography, in Ben C. Ollenburger, ed., 
Old Testament Theology: Flowering and Future (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 497–506.
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sequential, and they were not to be confused. This point of principle has 
generally remained, even as Gabler’s own distinctively 18th-century way 
of envisaging its implementation faded into history. One consequence of 
this in-principle division between the properly biblical and the properly 
dogmatic is that in practice the two tasks have increasingly tended to drift 
apart. The biblical scholar, at any rate, has increasingly attended to the na-
ture and meaning of the biblical texts in their ancient contexts, with ques-
tions of constructive theology addressed as something of an afterthought, 
if at all.
Of course, such an apparently neat division has consistently met with 
distinguished resistance. From the 19th century, Søren Kierkegaard and 
Martin Kähler come to mind. In the 20th century Karl Barth and Rudolf 
Bultmann led the way in insisting on holding together, in diverse modes, 
what Gabler’s trajectory tends to put asunder. The 20th century ended with 
hermeneutical theorists such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, 
and biblical scholars such as Brevard Childs, proposing fresh conceptuali-
ties. It is within this general context of resisting the separation of theolog-
ical truth from biblical meaning that it is most appropriate to locate the 
work of Susannah Ticciati.
Ticciati on the Grammar of Election  
and Jealousy in Romans 9–11
Ticciati does not go for an easy life when, as a theologian, she works 
with Scripture. In her doctoral dissertation, she tackled the book of Job. 2 
More recently, she has been working on Paul’s account of Israel in relation 
to God’s purposes in Christ in Rom 9–11. 3 It is on these two essays on Rom 
9–11 that I will focus here. In Rom 9–11, Paul cites Israel’s Scriptures ex-
tensively, in such a way that substantive issues in the interpretation of both 
Old and New Testaments are raised, and the theological interpretation of 
both Testaments is important to Ticciati’s work.
In general terms, Ticciati’s understanding of the role of Scripture in 
theology is clearly and powerfully expressed: “If theology, in relating ev-
erything to God as the source and telos of all being, engages people in 
their greatest depths, it does so, when drawing on Scripture, by searching 
the depths of Scripture: by articulating its deeply embedded patterns of 
reasoning in their healing and transformative power.” 4 Moreover, with ref-
2. This has been published as Susannah Ticciati, Job and the Disruption of Identity: Read-
ing beyond Barth (London: T&T Clark, 2005).
3. Idem, “The Nondivisive Difference of Election: A Reading of Romans 9–11,” JTI 6 
(2012): 257–78; idem, “Transforming the Grammar of Human Jealousy: Israel’s Jealousy in Ro-
mans 9–11,” in The Vocation of Theology Today: A Festschrift for David Ford, ed. Tom Greggs, 
Rachel Muers, and Simeon Zahl (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2013), 77–91.
4. Idem, “Transforming,” 78–79.
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erence to her indebtedness to her Doktorvater, David Ford, she speaks of 
their common “desire always to turn back to the scriptural source” with a 
“trust that every time it will yield abundant and surprising fruit.” At issue 
is a “non-reductive approach to Scripture and willingness to learn from all 
other interpretations, with no limits being placed on Scripture’s richness,” 
an approach rooted in a “belief in the infinite richness of the God to which 
Scripture witnesses.” 5
For her specific reading of Rom 9–11, Ticciati is clear at the outset 
about the basic theological conceptuality that informs her approach:
In Knowing the Unknowable God, David Burrell shows that, in order 
properly to characterize “divinity as distinct from whatever else there 
is,” “what is needed . . . is a distinction which makes its appearance, 
as it were, within the world as we know it, yet does not express a divi-
sion within that world.” For the divine difference, as it has also been 
called, is “unlike any other which we make to understand things in 
the world, for each of these, however formal, presumes the world as 
its background.” 6
Ticciati’s prime purpose is to give an account of the nature of divine elec-
tion according to Paul in Rom 9–11 in a way that does justice to Burrell’s 
notion of the divine difference. Although it is of course possible to un-
derstand Israel as “just another nation,” and so the distinction between 
Israel and the nations as “a merely creaturely division in the world,” Ticciati 
argues that it is also possible to understand Israel as “the Israel of God” 
in such a way that it “is therefore to be distinguished from other nations 
as God is to be distinguished from the gods of the nations—and thus ex-
presses no mere creaturely difference.” 7
Her core thesis in her reading of Paul’s argument is that “the election 
of Israel displays the God who cannot be described as ‘this God rather than 
that God,’ but altogether transcends creaturely distinction.” 8 More fully:
In its exclusion (as a turning point on the road to its salvation), Israel 
does not lose its God but finds its God as the God who is also the 
God of others. This God cannot be possessed as “my God” as opposed 
to “yours,” nor is God simply shared between Israel and the nations. 
Rather, God is Israel’s God precisely as the God of others. Paradoxi-
cally, God belongs all the more intensively to Israel as the God who 
does not belong to Israel. 9
5. Ibid., 79.
6. Idem, “Nondivisive,” 257. The reference is to David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable: 
Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 2, 17, 3.
7. Ticciati, “Nondivisive,” 258.
8. Ibid., 273.
9. Ibid., 271.
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This does not do away with the difference between Israel and the Gentiles, 
for the Gentiles share in Israel’s God “derivatively and therefore differ-
ently.” Although Paul’s account shows Israel’s distinctiveness to be “inher-
ently inclusive,” there remains differentiation within this inclusiveness, an 
“irreducibility of otherness”:
In sum, both Jewish and Gentile differences are needed together for 
the manifestation of the divine difference. Articulating both together, 
we can say that the difference God makes in God’s election of Israel 
is not one that divides (the chosen from the unchosen), but one that 
unites across the difference and differentiates within the unity. God 
is the God of Israel precisely as the God who cannot be possessed, 
unlike the gods of the nations who are shared and divided between 
them. Gentiles are invited to share in this God, but derivatively and 
differently, and therefore not in a way that collapses the difference of 
Israel. In sum, God, in electing Israel, does not make a particular dif-
ference, but rather changes the very grammar of difference: unity and 
difference are brought into relation such that unity no longer implies 
uniformity and difference no longer implies division. 10
Ticciati reads the whole of Rom 9–11 carefully, and engages both with 
textual details and with relevant secondary literature (in which she has read 
widely). For now, however, it is not possible to do more than highlight her 
main arguments and conclusions.
In terms of method and approach, she suggestively proposes that the 
well-known difficulty of holding together Paul’s argument as a whole (“Is 
he coherent?” “Is he consistent?”) represents “the rhetorical marks left on 
the text by the theological problem of the divine difference.” 11 Her reading 
of Rom 9–11 as a whole consistently displays her sense of Paul’s attempt to 
do justice to a divine difference that transcends all familiar human distinc-
tions: “the way in which Paul holds divine and human distinctions in cre-
ative tension . . . the tension [that] must be kept in play in order to point to 
the elusive divine difference.” 12 Or, until the end comes and “all Israel will 
be saved” (Rom 11:26), “the distinction between Israel and the Gentiles—if 
it is to manifest the divine difference—must be caught up in the dialectic 
sustained by Paul in the trajectory from 9:1 to 11:24.” 13
One particular issue within the text on which she focuses as the nec-
essary corollary of her thesis about election is jealousy, both human and 
divine (which is present in both essays, but is the particular focus of the 
second essay). The language of jealousy appears three times in Paul’s argu-
ment—Rom 10:19 (citing Deut 32:21 LXX); 11:11, 13–14—and clearly plays a 
10. Ibid., 272–73.
11. Ibid., 258.
12. Ibid., 265.
13. Ibid., 266.
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weighty role in Paul’s thinking about Israel and salvation: “Inasmuch then 
as I am an apostle to the Gentiles, I magnify my ministry in order to make 
my fellow Jews jealous, and thus save some of them” (11:13–14). Jealousy is a 
well-known human phenomenon, which is naturally understood in divisive 
and competitive terms. Ticciati notes that standard modern commentators 
on Rom 9–11 consistently understand Paul’s account of jealousy in such 
competitive terms, and she fully recognizes the prima facie plausibility of a 
“plain sense” reading that “God is using human competitiveness to the mu-
tual benefit of the competing parties.” 14 Nonetheless, she regards this as 
a “thin description,” at odds with Paul’s consistent reworking of apparent 
division in terms of divine difference. By way of contrast, she argues that 
“God’s provoking of Israel to jealousy is his transformation of the grammar 
of human jealousy.” 15
As she reads the biblical text, Ticciati is clear that the key issue “is 
not so much a question of philology as one of hermeneutics. How is the 
God of the Old Testament to be understood—through what hermeneuti-
cal lens?” Given her basic theological premise (“God is not just another 
character within the drama of salvation history, but the source, impetus, 
and telos of this salvation history”), it follows that “while anthropomorphic 
language cannot be avoided (indeed it is all we have to work with), it cannot 
be understood anthropomorphically.” She situates herself “in the tradition 
of exegesis of the likes of Tertullian and Origen, acknowledging the neces-
sary humanness of our language about God, but also the fact that when it is 
used in the divine context it accrues meaning appropriate to the divine.” 16
The biblical basis for her construal of jealousy is Paul’s citation of 
Deut 32, the Song of Moses. Ticciati notes that Paul’s first invocation of Is-
rael’s jealousy (Rom 10:19) includes a citation of Deut 32:21 (LXX), the full 
text of which reads: “They made me jealous with what is no God, provoked 
me with their idols. So I will make them jealous with what is no nation, pro-
voke them with a nation lacking understanding” (NETS). Although this is 
“arguably just a minor note in Deuteronomy,” Paul expands it into a central 
theme (and arguably “has in mind the whole Song” because his argument 
in Rom 9–11 “recapitulates its broader narrative pattern” from election 
through sin and judgment to salvation). The key point of significance in 
Deut 32:21 lies in the fact that “Israel’s jealousy is here paralleled with God’s 
jealousy. Should we not be open, therefore, to its taking on a different dy-
namic from human jealousy more generally, insofar as it comes to reflect 
God’s own distinctive jealousy?” 17
How then should the divine jealousy provoked by Israel’s idolatry be 
understood? Ticciati argues on the basis of an understanding of the nature 
14. Ibid., 268; cf. idem, “Transforming,” 81.
15. Ibid., 78.
16. Ibid., 84.
17. Ibid., 81, 82.
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of creation—creation ex nihilo, as interpreted by Rowan Williams, and 
evoked in the OT by Ps 139, Job 38–41, and Gen 1—that one should think 
in terms of “a relationship between God and creation in which God is the 
whole context and presupposition of creation, such that creation has no 
independent standpoint from which it can struggle against God, even in its 
rebellion.” In the light of this, “any autonomy gained in contradistinction to 
God’s can only be an illusion. Evil only corrupts the creature and thus is bet-
ter described (if it can be at all) as a struggle of the creature against itself.” 18
It follows from this that one should not think of Israel’s idolatry as en-
visaging autonomous creaturely agency, such that the creature “can choose 
to take or leave God, running off with foreign gods.” For “if God is the 
whole context of creaturely being, then there is no taking leave of God. 
God cannot be threatened by such desertion, or by the third party [other 
gods/idols] that tempts to desertion.” To say this, however, does not mean 
that “God is indifferent towards Israel’s coming and goings.” How then 
should the divine jealousy be understood? The basic point, as already noted, 
is that language used of God “accrues meaning appropriate to the divine.” 
Thus, “God’s ‘jealousy’ transcends both creaturely passion and creaturely 
impassivity” and “is most appropriately reinterpreted as God’s radical ori-
entation towards Israel’s well-being”: “God harnesses everything for the 
good of Israel, even when God does so in ways that are incomprehensible 
to it, bringing into question the devices and desires of its own heart. But the 
result will always be Israel’s liberation, and specifically, its liberation from 
idolatry. It is just such liberation in which Deuteronomy 32 culminates.” 19
If this gives an indication of what it means for God to be jealous, when 
nothing can be a threat to God’s sovereignty, what, according to Paul, does 
it mean for Israel to be jealous in the light of God’s turning to the Gen-
tiles? Ticciati develops the point that in Deut 32:21 (LXX), as already cited, 
Israel’s jealousy comes in the context of God’s jealousy. Israel’s jealousy 
should thus be understood to be shaped noncompetitively by the distinc-
tiveness of the divine jealousy:
Israel’s God, as we learn from the nature of God’s jealousy in Deut 32, 
is not one whom it could possibly lose to another, for God is not one 
suitor among others but is the very context of Israel’s freedom and 
identity, radically oriented toward Israel’s well-being. By the same to-
ken, this God has the capacity—without diluting his relationship with 
Israel—to enter into relation with other nations, because God is not a 
finite creature among others who could be fought over and divided up 
between them but is the infinite context of them all. 20
18. Ibid., 84, 85; cf. idem, “Nondivisive,” 270.
19. Idem, “Transforming,” 85.
20. Idem, “Nondivisive,” 270–71
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It follows that “Israel’s jealousy is bound up with its recognition that its 
God is also the God of the Gentiles. If jealousy normally involves the de-
sire for exclusive possession, in Israel’s case, its jealousy, as desire for this 
God, must take the paradoxical form of the desire to embrace the God 
who is also the God of others and relinquish the God who is (exclusively) 
its God.” Thus, to conclude this exposition where we began, Ticciati argues 
that according to Paul’s account in Rom 9–11: “This God cannot be pos-
sessed as ‘my God’ as opposed to ‘yours,’ nor is God simply shared between 
Israel and the nations. Rather, God is Israel’s God precisely as the God of 
others. Paradoxically, God belongs all the more intensively to Israel as the 
God who does not belong to Israel.” 21
On this account, both Israel’s election and Israel’s jealousy are to be 
understood consistently as noncompetitive and nonpossessive in Paul’s 
account.
Toward an Evaluation of Ticciati:  
Deuteronomy 32 and the Nature of Divine Jealousy  
in the Old Testament
How best should this reading be evaluated? At the outset, I should 
register significant agreements. For example, I like the methodological 
proposal that the difficult mode of argument is a reflection of the intrinsic 
difficulty of its subject matter, the struggle to articulate the “divine differ-
ence” of the ways of God with Israel and the Gentiles; and I am persuaded 
by the particular construal that “the only failure of Israel . . . is its non-
allegiance to Christ, or its unbelief.” 22 However, I would also like to probe 
a little, and hopefully, among other things, elicit further clarification from 
Ticciati herself as to how best to evaluate this reading of Rom 9–11.
So as to try to have a sharp focus, I want to highlight Ticciati’s use of 
Deut 32 in relation to election and jealousy. Although in her general dis-
cussion of Rom 9–11 she engages with a wide range of scholarly literature, 
here she solely interacts with a single monograph, Richard Bell’s Provoked 
to Jealousy: The Origin and Purpose of the Jealousy Motif in Romans 9–11, 23 apart 
from a passing reference in the second essay to a dictionary article on the 
root qop-nun-alep, classically translated “jealous” or “zealous.” 24 This may 
of course simply indicate that Ticciati’s study is a work in progress (her 
earlier work on Job engages extensively with the literature and issues of OT 
21. Ibid., 271.
22. Ibid., 276.
23. Richard Bell, Provoked to Jealousy: The Origin and Purpose of the Jealousy Motif in Romans 
9–11, WUNT 2/63 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994).
24. The reference (Ticciati, “Transforming,” 84) is to H. G. L. Peels, “qanaʾ,” in New 
International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem Van Gemeren, 5 vols. 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 3:937–40.
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scholarship). 25 Nonetheless, without prejudice to what she may yet write, 
I would like to reflect on her handling of the OT in this project as it cur-
rently stands.
Particularly significant is Ticciati’s comment on the account of Israel’s 
liberation from its enslavement to gods who are no gods in Deut 32:36–39:
One could, of course, read this as God’s competitive triumph over 
rival gods, in which he violently takes Israel back to himself. But this 
would be to understand his power and sovereignty on the model of 
human rulers, who must gain power over their rivals and subjects. But 
if God is not just another force alongside creatures (in which case 
his difference from them would be just another division within the 
world) but rather the context for all creaturely life, then divine power 
is not an imposition from without. It is, rather, the source of crea-
turely freedom and identity [footnote reference to Rowan Williams]. 
In that case, God’s jealousy cannot involve a competitive rivalry with 
Israel’s suitors (God’s being merely the most powerful suitor). Instead, 
it is most appropriately envisaged as God’s radical orientation toward 
Israel’s well-being; his harnessing of everything for the good of Israel 
(even when this is in ways that are incomprehensible to Israel, as is the 
case within Rom 9–11). 26
Moreover, Ticciati sees Paul’s reading of Deut 32, although of course a re-
reading in the light of Christ, to be drawing out something that was already 
present in the text: “This truth was already there in Deuteronomy 32, but it is 
sounded at a new and heightened pitch in Christ, as God expands his cov-
enant to include the Gentiles”; “the Christ-event, instead of bringing about 
a binary opposition between old and new Israel, reveals and renews a non-
divisive difference between Israel and the nations, Jews and Gentiles.” 27
I would like to come at this via the typical concern of the biblical 
scholar with doing justice to the biblical documents in relation to their 
context of origin: What do the biblical texts mean as ancient texts from, 
say, the seventh century BC or the first century AD? To be sure, this typi-
cal concern has tended to marginalize questions of high importance about 
the recontextualization and appropriation of the biblical documents in 
Christian and Jewish frames of reference, and as such has contributed to 
the problem to which contemporary interest in theological interpretation 
is seeking to respond. Nonetheless, because this concern has been funda-
mental to the development of biblical studies in the modern world, it still 
needs to be taken seriously by those who seek to complexify and transform 
25. Ticciati also sounds the caveat: “While the task of establishing the nature of divine 
jealousy within the HB is beyond the capacity of this article, I will nevertheless offer a limited 
but suggestive reading of it within the context of the Song of Moses” (Ticciati, “Nondivisive,” 
269).
26. Ibid., 270.
27. Idem, “Transforming,” 89, emphasis added; idem, “Nondivisive,” 276.
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the categories of interpretive debate. It represents the concern not only of 
the philologist and the historian to do justice to ancient texts in their own 
right but also of many a theologian who wants to hear Scripture as far as 
possible in its own voice without accommodating it to the possibly self-
serving preferences and prejudices of its readers.
Because Ticciati is so well aware of the general nature of modern bib-
lical scholarship, I imagine that it may well be with a provocative twinkle 
in her eye that she undertakes to read Rom 9–11, and Deut 32, in the light 
of Burrell’s account of the “divine difference” and of “creation ex nihilo, as 
interpreted by Williams.” For Ticciati knows full well that creation ex nihilo 
is generally recognized as a postbiblical doctrinal formulation (and I am 
sure that she has no desire to contest this), and that Burrell is reflecting on 
the enduring legacy of high medieval philosophical theology as articulated 
in the interaction of prime Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers. And 
she knows that to use postbiblical doctrine in the interpretation of the 
biblical text is, in the eyes of many scholars, to commit the basic error of 
anachronism, the error of inappropriately mingling biblical thought with 
post biblical dogmatic thought in a way that means that the Bible is not 
rightly heard on its own terms. Ticciati knows that anachronism can be a 
problem that skews interpretation, and she herself makes good use of the 
importance of not being anachronistic when she disposes of those who 
would charge Paul with any form of Christian anti-Judaism. 28 But the ques-
tion may be asked: does her use of creation ex nihilo, with its conceptual 
refinement by Burrell and Williams, open her also to the charge of misread-
ing or skewing the sense of the biblical text, albeit in a distinctive way?
A simple objection to Ticciati’s reading could therefore be formulated 
thus: what if the ancient biblical writer did, to a greater or lesser extent, 
envisage God’s power and sovereignty on the model of human rulers? The 
fact that subsequent theology came to resist this sort of notion does not 
entail that the biblical writer did also. One must be open to recognize 
where biblical thought resists accommodation to postbiblical thought.
There are at least three prima facie possible responses that might be 
offered to this objection. First, the difference between OT and subsequent 
thought is only apparent rather than real; a noncompetitive understand-
ing of jealousy is in fact the intrinsic meaning of the OT text. Second, the 
OT and subsequent understandings are indeed radically different; but this 
need not matter for Christian theology, the logic and integrity of whose 
understandings need to be evaluated by criteria other than conformity to 
biblical meanings. Third, there are various forms of mediating position, to 
the effect that whereas the later (postbiblical) understanding may indeed 
not be that of the biblical writer, it nonetheless stands in continuity with 
the biblical meaning, such that it is extending and developing the biblical 
28. Ibid., 273–74.
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subject matter rather than changing it (operating with a text- and reader-
hermeneutic more than with an author-hermeneutic). Because the first 
option might be rather hard to establish, and because the second option 
would relativize the importance of Scripture for theology in a way that is 
at odds with Ticciati’s high evaluation of the theological significance of 
Scripture, I imagine that it would be the third option, in one form or other, 
that would be most promising for understanding Ticciati’s approach.
Even if the key issue is “not so much a question of philology as one of 
hermeneutics,” the question remains of how to hold philology and herme-
neutics together in ways that are mutually illuminating rather than allowing 
them to drift apart with the result that their relationship becomes tenuous 
or forced. Put differently, in terms of Ticciati’s categories, there is surely 
a real question whether the difference between Israel and the nations ex-
pressed by Israel’s election in the OT is not indeed a division within the 
world that separates the chosen from the unchosen in creaturely categories.
Election and the Distinction between  
Clean and Unclean
An interesting example of some of the issues at stake may lie in the 
connection between Israel’s election and Israel’s dietary laws, in terms of 
the need to eat clean but not unclean animals. In Lev 20, Israel’s distin-
guishing between the clean and unclean is to emulate God’s own action in 
separating Israel from the nations:
I am the Lord your God; I have separated you from the peoples. You 
shall therefore make a distinction between the clean animal and the 
unclean, and between the unclean bird and the clean; you shall not 
bring abomination on yourselves by animal or by bird or by anything 
with which the ground teems, which I have set apart for you to hold 
unclean. You shall be holy to me; for I the Lord am holy, and I have 
separated you from the other peoples to be mine. (20:22–26)
The distinction between clean and unclean animals symbolizes a distinc-
tion between Israel, implicitly a clean nation, and other peoples, implicitly 
unclean nations. The holiness of Israel is a facet of their elect status, which 
is to be symbolized in the everyday act of eating. (To be sure, in historic and 
contemporary practice Jews have understood the dietary laws in further 
categories also. Nonetheless, insofar as the practice of kashrut, itself a rab-
binic development of the biblical material, has been retained, its biblical 
logic has not been abandoned. Eating according to kashrut is in important 
ways a symbolic act, symbolic of Israel’s elect and holy status before God).
This issue is illuminated by the most famous and extensive engage-
ment with the issue of clean and unclean animals in the NT, in a narrative 
that explicitly depicts a retraction of the clean and unclean distinction in 
the light of Christ—the story of Cornelius and Peter in Acts 10. The story 
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opens with Cornelius, a devout and God-fearing Gentile, in prayer. He is 
given a divine vision in which he is told that God has heard his prayers. He 
is then instructed to summon “a certain Simon who is called Peter,” who is 
at a particular house in Joppa. He duly sends off three trustworthy men to 
find this Simon Peter. The scene then shifts to Peter, who is also at prayer 
and also receives a vision:
He saw the heaven opened and something like a large sheet coming 
down, being lowered to the ground by its four corners. In it were all 
kinds of four-footed creatures and reptiles and birds of the air. Then 
he heard a voice saying, “Get up, Peter; kill and eat.” But Peter said, 
“By no means, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is profane 
or unclean.” The voice said to him again, a second time, “What God 
has made clean, you must not call profane.” (10:11–15)
It is a memorable scenario. The divine voice tells Peter to ignore and/or 
transgress the scriptural dietary restrictions. Unsurprisingly, Peter declines 
to do so, for that would mean being fundamentally false to his Jewish iden-
tity and allegiance. But the divine voice then says that it is acceptable for 
him to eat, for God himself has abolished the distinction between clean 
and unclean by making the unclean clean. We may note that God does not 
explain how or when the unclean has been made clean, just that this is now 
the case. We may also note that Peter does not actually have to kill and eat, 
but rather is left to ponder the meaning of the vision in a state of being 
“greatly puzzled.”
At this point, the men sent by Cornelius arrive. Peter, still puzzling 
over the vision, is given an explicit divine instruction: “Go with them with-
out hesitation; for I have sent them.” When Peter speaks with the men, 
he learns that they are from a godly Gentile, Cornelius, who had received 
a divine direction to summon him; and he provides hospitality and then 
goes with them. When Peter arrives at Cornelius’s home, he says to him, 
together with his assembled family and friends: “You yourselves know that 
it is unlawful for a Jew to associate with or to visit a Gentile; but God has 
shown me that I should not call anyone profane or unclean. So when I 
was sent for, I came without objection. Now may I ask why you sent for 
me?” (10:28–29). Cornelius tells his story, and Peter responds by speaking 
of Jesus, though prefacing what he says with these words: “I truly under-
stand that God shows no partiality, but in every nation anyone who fears 
him and does what is right is acceptable to him” (10:34–35). Peter’s words 
about Jesus are then accompanied by the Holy Spirit’s coming upon all who 
heard him. Peter’s companions are astonished “that the gift of the Holy 
Spirit had been poured out even on the Gentiles,” and Peter duly instructs 
that Cornelius with his family and friends be baptized on the grounds that 
“these people [Gentiles] . . . have received the Holy Spirit just as we [ Jews] 
have” (10:47).
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The intrinsic meaning of the sequence of events is admirably grasped 
and articulated by Peter. He was given a vision of clean and unclean animals 
and told to eat without making any distinction. He subsequently tells Cor-
nelius that God has shown him that he should not call any person profane 
or unclean. That is, Peter understands the logic of Lev 20:24–26, that clean 
and unclean animals symbolize clean and unclean peoples, and that it is this 
logic that has been set aside by God.
Perhaps surprisingly, neither Peter nor the narrator explicitly amplify 
or clarify the words, “What God has made clean (ekatharisen) you must not 
call profane.” Jesus on one occasion said something about what people eat, 
and its inability to defile a person, a saying on which Mark commented 
that he thereby “declared all foods clean” (katharizōn panta ta brōmata, Mark 
7:19). However, it is highly unlikely that a single saying of Jesus, which was 
addressed to general issues of defilement and not to dietary laws and which 
is unmentioned by Luke, could be envisaged as the moment of God’s “mak-
ing clean.” Even though the saying was seen by Mark as apparently applying 
to dietary laws, this is an interpretation in retrospect, quite possibly after 
a recognition on other grounds that food laws no longer applied to the fol-
lowers of Jesus in the way that they had applied previously; Mark sees this 
new state of affairs as already implicit in Jesus’s teaching. In the context 
of Luke–Acts, Peter’s speaking about Jesus and the consequent descent of 
the Holy Spirit surely indicate that the logic of making clean is bound up 
with Jesus and the Spirit. In terms of Luke’s overall narrative we should 
probably think of the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus and the 
coming of the Spirit at Pentecost as that time when God “made clean” 
what hitherto had been unclean, a reality whose fuller dimensions are now 
being disclosed. The crucified and risen Jesus opens the historic people 
of Israel to Jew and Gentile alike through the Holy Spirit, and in so doing 
makes unnecessary the dietary laws that hitherto had symbolically set apart 
Israel from Gentile nations.
There are of course specific questions that can be asked about the rela-
tionship between the understanding of Israel’s election in Lev 20 and that 
in Deut 32, and also about how the understanding of the difference that 
Jesus makes to Israel’s election is distinctively articulated in Luke–Acts and 
in Paul. In general terms, however, Ticciati’s thesis about Israel’s election as 
not expressing “a creaturely difference” that is “a division within the world” 
surely needs greater clarification in relation to the differences of portrayal 
of election in Old and New Testaments.
Biblical Reading and Creation ex Nihilo
From among other questions that may also (much more briefly!) be 
asked, I raise just two, one in this section, and one in the next. First, how 
best should a postbiblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo be utilized in read-
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ing the Bible? Ticciati sees the doctrine as implying “a relationship between 
God and creation in which God is the whole context and presupposition 
of creation, such that creation has no independent standpoint from which 
it can struggle against God, even in its rebellion.” As a result of this, “evil 
will thus have to be interpreted in a very particular way, not as an indepen-
dent principle, or as the rebellion of an autonomous creature; indeed, any 
autonomy gained in contradistinction to God’s can only be an illusion. Evil 
only corrupts the creature and thus is better described (if it can be at all) as 
a struggle of the creature against itself.” Within the OT, she sees this sort 
of understanding of God as “evoked” by Ps 139, “portrayed” by Job 38–41, 
and “implied” by Gen 1. 29 I presume that the purpose of these biblical ref-
erences is not to seek in any way to establish creation ex nihilo on a biblical 
basis but rather to suggest that certain weighty biblical passages are open 
to being read in a way that is consonant with the concerns of creation ex 
nihilo. Would this then mean that creation ex nihilo should be understood 
somewhat along the lines of the double love commandment, that is, as a 
fundamental perspective to be brought to bear on all else as a way of read-
ing and appropriating it, even if the material on its own terms might not be 
so understood? This could be promising, though it surely requires further 
clarification, not least in relation to the issue of criteria by which one might 
recognize whether at least sometimes this sort of perspective might skew, 
rather than illuminate, the subject matter of the biblical text.
Toward Theological Interpretation  
of Paul’s Reading of Israel in Romans 9–11
Second, Ticciati argues for a reading of Paul whereby Israel remains 
Israel and Gentiles remain Gentiles in the light of Christ, but in such a way 
that their irreducible difference does not prevent them from being united 
nondivisively in God. My question relates to how far this is a reading of 
Paul on his own terms in Rom 9–11 and how far this is a rereading of Paul 
in the light of the formation and persistence of Judaism and Christianity 
as distinct continuing realities through until today and perhaps specifically 
in the light of contemporary Jewish-Christian dialogue in the context of 
Scriptural Reasoning. 30
For it is doubtful whether Paul envisaged anything like what has ac-
tually happened. Paul relates his discussion of Israel to the nature and 
purpose of his own ministry (Rom 11:13–14), and he sees the pattern of 
disobedience and mercy as being realized in his context of ministry. This 
is especially brought out by the thrice-repeated “now” (nun) in the climax 
29. Ticciati, “Transforming,” 85.
30. “Scriptural Reasoning” is a contemporary practice of interfaith dialogue, primarily 
between Jews, Christians, and Muslims, which is centered on reading together the Scriptures 
of each tradition. See the Journal of Scriptural Reasoning. Online: http://jsr.shanti.virginia.edu.
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of his argument (11:30–32): “Just as you [Gentiles] were once disobedient 
to God but have now [nun] received mercy because of their [Israel in part] 
disobedience, so they have now [nun] been disobedient in order that, by 
the mercy shown to you, they too may now [nun] receive mercy. For God 
has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all.” Ad-
mittedly, the third “now” is missing in some manuscripts, but it is almost 
certainly original to Paul’s text because of the complementary destinies of 
both Gentile and Jew in Paul’s argument as recipients of divine mercy. The 
omission of the third “now,” and even in a few manuscripts its replacement 
by “later” [hysteron], surely attests subsequent scribal modification in the 
light of events, an attempt to deal with the difficulty that the response to 
the gospel had not been as Paul had apparently expected.
That Christians today live in situations and frames of reference 
(thought worlds, social imaginaries, and so on) not envisaged by the biblical 
writers is of course an uncontroversial recognition. For present purposes, 
the interesting questions relate to how best to sustain a dialectic between 
present and past in ways that do justice to both in terms of the reading 
of Scripture. Because historic Israel did not respond to the gospel in the 
way that Paul hoped for, how are Christians to understand and appropriate 
Paul’s discussion? One can, for example, envisage all time since Jesus as an 
eschatological now, a time in which God’s ultimate realities beyond history 
have been definitively revealed (in Jesus) within and are always impinging 
(through the Spirit) on history. Even if this sort of understanding may have 
some real affinities with Paul’s understanding of time, it could hardly, when 
almost two millennia have passed, be identical with it. If then affinity and 
continuity, rather than identity or exact correspondence, prove to be the 
categories in which Christian theology seeks to appropriate Scripture, how 
should these be related to the typical concern of the biblical scholar to 
establish precise textual meaning?
We conclude with some of the basic questions of theological inter-
pretation of Scripture. How best do we synthetically integrate Pauline 
thought with that of the wider canon and of historic theology? How best 
do we articulate and exemplify the ways in which Scripture is both source 
and norm for theology? Although in a sense these are commonplace ques-
tions in Christian theology, it is perhaps more common in practice for 
people simply to adopt a particular stance rather than to reflect on it. It 
is a strength of Ticciati’s work that she raises fundamental hermeneutical 
questions in a sharp form.
